Is the Chinese People's Liberation Army a Paper Tiger? Kyle Murao • 10/29 22:45 This is a very interesting question; if any Quorans could figure out the truth, there is probably a nice job with their name on it at the Pentagon or the Central Intelligence Agency. So here is how I'd think about it.Before I get to the meat of the answer though, let's first briefly consider the perspective articulated in Diplomat article the question cites. I consider The Diplomat to be an interesting online source of defense-, trade- and politics-related commentary on the Asian Pacific region, and I read it pretty frequently. I would also suggest that on the China-outlook scale ranging from "Sycophantic adoration" through "Benign embrace" to "Paranoid Sinophobia", The Diplomat's editorial positions frequently fall somewhere between the latter two. Its writers are very smart, very thoughtful, and very well-informed; but on the whole, its product tends to take a mistrusting view both of China's strategic intentions and ability to restrain its jingoistic military. As a result, you very typically end up with articles that conclude as this one does--crudely speaking, that China's military is a source of potential geopolitical instability because the PLA is led by lambs who think they're lions. The asker seems to be a little skeptical of this underlying premise, and I think they are right to be. Here's why. Perhaps the most common-sense place to start is with a quick comparison of China against other major military powers on the basis of some simple metrics. It's a cursory glance at these, allegeThe Diplomat and others, which misleads many observers into thinking that China is far stronger than it appears. So just what are these observers on about when they warn of China's military power? Getting hold of this data is, thanks to the Greatest Invention Since the Cotton Gin a.k.a. Wikipedia, pretty simple; compiling it and formatting it nicely is an MS Excel exercise I could do in my sleep.Economic & demographic metrics [view image] The table above summarizes some key metrics for the world's most powerful militaries. The first two rows are somewhat stale statistics, perhaps more relevant during the days of the Industrial Revolution, when sheer manpower numbers mattered much more, than they do in today's tech-heavy battlefields. (For a good discussion about this, see:Dan Holliday's answer to Who would win in this war: the USA, the U.K, Japan, and South Korea vs Russia, China, and North Korea?) The next two rows describe the sizes of each country's respective trained armed forces, both regular and reserve. The last four are economic. GDP in dollar terms as well as purchasing power parity (PPP) describe how wealthy a country is, defense budget is an indicator of how much it spends on gear and people, and foreign exchange reserves (FX) is how much foreign hard currency and gold a country has. (Note that the US, which prints the world's reserve currency, does not need to hold much--it's good to be da king!) [1]China (PRC) is far larger than any other country bar India in terms of population, and produces more economic output than any other than the United States. It has the second-largest defense budget, and by far the largest number of men under arms. If we ignore the global powers and zero in on the Asia Pacific region, we find that China's advantages versus its local rivals are even more pronounced (this will come up again later): [view image] There are plenty of advanced economies in this list--Korea, Japan, Australia, Singapore--but taken together, their combined defense budgets are still smaller than China's. It's difficult to see why on any of these metrics, China even remotely resembles a paper tiger. It has a robust economy, large manpower reserves, a highly sophisticated technology and manufacturing base to produce war materials, and plenty of foreign currency to fend off the capital flight problems that might result from a sudden outbreak of war. Its people and government have extremely low levels of debt and and the government's tight control over the media and institutions means that domestic pressures, while certainly existent, don't divide the country the same way that they do in other major powers in Europe and America.And to the extent that China is dependent for commerce on markets in America, Europe and elsewhere, which could easily be disrupted by conflict, it should also be said that many of China's critical trading partners are just as dependent for their livelihoods on it. Trade policy and economic development may not be directly tied to the People's Liberation Army itself but clearly from a strategic point of view, it isn't a coincidence that these things are closely managed by the Communist Party, which also oversees the military. All this goes to saying that, whatever the capabilities of the PLA may be, China itself starts off any discussion from a position of undisputed strength. This contrasts pretty sharply with the Soviet Union, China's predecessor as holder of the "paper tiger" title, with the obvious difference that unlike China, the name was very appropriate; the USSR produced fine military equipment and excellent soldiers, but ultimately, its economy couldn't adapt to the pressures of globalization that were already starting to hurt in the 70's and 80's. China, on the other hand, seems to be handling its economy rather well.China's Aspirations vs. Reality [view image] So given that China is indisputably the second most powerful country on the face of the earth, we then have to ask ourselves if its strategic goals are somehow out of sync with its ability to achieve those goals. Or, to paraphrase the Gospel of Top Gun, Chapter 1, Verse 1:Is China's ego writing checks that its body can't cash? As I said above, the USSR became the classic paper tiger, with foreign policy and defense obligations far exceeding its capacity to meet its objectives. To defeat an anticipated invasion, the US military garrisoned Germany with the most powerful American armored force the world had ever seen, supported by whole air fleets of attack planes, fighters, strategic bombers and helicopters. Fearful of Soviet wolf packs disrupting its commercial and military sea lines of communication, the United States Navy became the mightiest ever, with more aircraft carriers than the rest of the world combined, hundreds of advanced cruisers and destroyers, and a fleet of submarines that are still among the world's most sophisticated even 30 years after they were first built. The US built a nuclear arsenal comprising hundreds of bombers, dozens of ballistic missile submarines and hardened land-based missile silos scattered across thousands of square miles. Soviet operations in Central and South America, in the Caribbean, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the Middle East, in Central and Southeast Asia, forced the US to deploy legions of soldiers and spooks everywhere across the globe in an effort to check those efforts. All this, the US was compelled to do right up until the day that, to everyone's apparent surprise (though warning signs had been there for years), the Soviet empire simply imploded.Yet it's quite clear that China has no such global presence, nor does it aspire to one. Chinese special forces aren't arming Cubans, Angolans, Syrians or Vietnamese and training them to fight Americans. Chinese tanks and attack helicopters aren't stationed right on the doorstep to Western Europe, threatening a land invasion. Chinese boats may be sailing around Japan in defiant nationalistic PR stunts, but they aren't patrolling around the Chesapeake or in the Gulf of Mexico. In the realm of diplomacy, China has openly pledged itself (and for the most part strictly adhered) to a policy of non-intervention in foreign countries' domestic affairs. Whether this is because it finds nothing objectionable about unsavory regimes in the Sudan, Angola or Pakistan, or simply because it lacks the capability to interfere effectively, the fact is that China has planted no stakes in the ground in farflung regions of the world where, if events took a turn for the worst, its words would need to be backed up with military force.Where Chinahas been very aggressive is in its own backyard: the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In this, it is aided by the fact that, whatever strength may lie on the farther shores of the Pacific, China's outweighs all of its local rivals combined. Japan, South Korea, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia, Malaysia and Taiwan do not have the manpower, equipment or industrial output to match China, and China also enjoys the advantage of the central position. [Cf.The central position] Just since Xi Jinping's ascendance as President in late 2012, China has: Landed troops on the Scarborough Shoal, a disputed outcropping also claimed by the Philippines Sent patrols both by the PLA Navy and civilian maritime law enforcement agencies to interdict "illegal" fishing activities by Viet Nam, the Philippines, Malaysia and others in the South China Sea More aggressively asserted its claim over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, much to Japan's consternation Vastly increased the frequency of its naval and air patrols over disputed territory both with Korea and Japan Ordered all aircraft within an air defense zone covering much of this disputed territory to identify themselves (the ADIZ) Harassed US Navy ships in what the US Navy claims are international waters [view image] I do not take a position on whether China's claims in all of these matters are legitimate or not.[2]Assuming China's perspective that they are, however, there is little doubt that Beijing takes them all very seriously, and that it intends steadily, if slowly, to back them up with concrete military force. The decision to begin rigorously asserting these claims is not borne out of some grand delusion about China's place in history or the world; it is, rather, a very logical conclusion based on the PLA's assessments of its capabilities. 18 years ago, China could do little more than stand by and then back down when the United States sent an aircraft carrier battle group to within a few hundred miles of the Chinese coast in a saber-rattling maneuver intended to warn off the mainland from America's strategic interests in Taiwan. A few years after that, a collision between a Chinese fighter (whose pilot was killed) and an American surveillance plane ended when China meekly returned the crew and the aircraft, without receiving much more than an apology for the intrusion.Today, however, the military muscle underlying the Chinese leadership's newfound assertiveness is a very different institution. For one thing, it is considerably smaller than it was when the Cold War ended, and has increased its training emphasis on professionalism and quality. Whereas prior to the 1990s the PLA was still very much a land-based force stuck in Mao Zedong's principles of insurgency and human-wave attacks (think frontal assaults by the Chinese on Marine and Army positions at the Chosin Reservoir), the Chinese military today has significantly modernized its equipment and adopted much more sophisticated ideas about how it should fight in the future.The Carrier-killer Missile [view image] Perhaps no element of this different thinking is more prominent or more important than the concept of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD, in the US Navy's shorthand); and no single weapon epitomizes the concept more than the DF-21 "carrier killer" ballistic missile which China has been developing and deploying at feverish pace (a Chinese news station helpfully created the image above to give Chinese and perhaps American viewers a visual idea of what it is supposed to do). The concept of A2/AD is perhaps best explained by experts, among whom, sadly, I cannot count myself: Anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) has become a focal point for China’s military since 1996, when the US sent two aircraft carrier groups as a show of support for Taiwan during Chinese missile tests designed to intimidate voters. The most obvious A2/AD program under development is the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), which has entered the initial operational capability stage. The missile is unique in that no other country has successfully developed a conventional ballistic missile capable of hitting a ship. There is a debate within the Western analytical community about whether this missile is capable of performing this task without the proper targeting satellites and electronic countermeasures.China’s A2/AD strategy is intended to force the US military to operate farther from the mainland and make it difficult for US strike missions to knock out China’s military eyes and ears. China’s massive complex of advanced underground facilities is part of the effort to impede the US from destroying command-and-control nodes during a war. Any attempt by the US to use its stealthy F-22 fighter jets and B-2 bombers to cripple underground facilities would face China’s ongoing attempts to defeat stealth technology. [3] To clear up any ambiguity, a ballistic missile, as distinct from a cruise missile or other type, is intended to be launched at very high speed out of the atmosphere into space, and then fall back to earth following a ballistic path, directed toward its target by some form of guidance system. The salient points about the DF-21 are that (1) it is believed capable of being aimed at a small moving target such as an aircraft carrier rather than large stationary one like a city, as nuclear missiles are, and (2) it re-enters the atmosphere and hits the target at Mach 10, many times faster than a rifle bullet, rather than Mach 1 or so for typical anti-ship missiles like the French Exocet or American Harpoon. Because it is so much faster, it is more difficult to shoot down or evade. To be sure, there continue to be doubts about just how accurate the missile is; whether China has the technical know-how to make the precise guidance systems to direct the weapon is unclear, as is whether or not it has the powerful radars and satellites that would be needed to find the target in the first place. And as if to underline that skepticism, China has continued to invest heavily in other arms of the A2/AD strategy as well--regular anti-ship missiles, large numbers of fighters and attack planes, and both conventional and nuclear attack submarines.For the purpose of responding to the original question, however, the technical details of the A2/AD strategy matter somewhat less than the goal it is intended to achieve: sealing off critical areas of the Western Pacific to allow the rest of the PLA to do its work. The DF-21 is a land-based weapon, and the Chinese intend to use it not to attack Hawaii or San Diego, but rather to keep America out of the South and East China Seas. The PLA high command seems to have judged that, in the event of conflict, America would be exceedingly cautious about deploying the precious aircraft carriers for fear of them being crippled or sunk hundreds of miles before they are themselves able to threaten the Chinese mainland. As I recently discussed elsewhere[ 4] this is sound thinking, given the expense in time, labor, resources and training that are required to build and man a carrier today, compared with the past. For example, the US produced hundreds of aircraft carriers in 4 years during the Second World War; today, construction of USSJohn F. Kennedy, the next supercarrier, was begun two years ago in 2011, and is not scheduled for completion until 2020. By developing and deploying a weapon like the DF-21 in huge numbers, then, the PLA has significantly increased the risk to the United States of losing critical assets such as aircraft carriers, and indeed made the calculus of war dramatically more difficult.Whether the DF-21 and the rest of China's A2/AD arsenal turned out to be as effective as hoped is a big question, obviously. But the same could be said of America's weapons, or for that matter Russia's, Japan's or Korea's. The truth is that all-out total war of the kind last seen in 1945 would be very different from what the world's biggest and best militaries have experienced in places like Iraq, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, and so on. To criticize the PLA for pinning strategic success on a new missile and untested submarines may be valid. However, it is not proof that China's military is a paper tiger, just as the fact that the US military has not gone toe to toe against a truly top-notch professional army since the Wehrmacht is not proof somehow that it, too, is a paper tiger.Assassin's Mace [view image] So far, we've seen how (1) China's economy is capable of building and supporting the military that it would need to pursue almost any foreign policy or military objective, and (2) China's assertiveness on the world stage has grown in step with clear progress in making the PLA more modern and more deadly. On these two bases alone, it seems that the PLA is very much aware of its limitations and has made a determined effort to develop weapons that make up for its weaknesses. There is, beyond these things, an additional element that leads me away from the idea that the PLA is a paper tiger: cyber-warfare.It's beyond debate that the US military leads all other contenders in combat experience. American pilots fly more than their Chinese counterparts, American sailors sail more and farther and aboard better ships, American soldiers and Marines have fought and died and led and learned through trial by enemy fire where Chinese soldiers have mainly been used in rescue efforts and in quashing internal problems. In each of these dimensions, China's main rival has a significant edge over it due to this experience--but in cyber-warfare, China has been a potent and effective player for just as long as America has, since the 1990s.Because America's military is substantially more networked and dependent on electronic infrastructure like computers and satellites, it has that many more vulnerable places for PLA cyber-warriors to probe and attack or defeat. An article from a few years ago in Wired gives some idea of what sorts of advantages the PLA might seek: U.S. airpower depends on the ability to overcome surface-to-air missile defenses, and one of the key weapons for this role is the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-radiation Missile (HARM), which homes in on radar emissions... The defenders can either turn off their radar, thus blinding themselves, or have it destroyed. This is where a black box at a military trade show in Zhuhai in 2002 comes in:“…packed inside were several thousand microtransmitters and when you plugged the device in and turned it on, it broadcast signals – 10,000 of them – on the frequency of a SAM site. From the perspective of an American pilot – or , more precisely, the perspective of his HARM missile looking for a ‘lock’ on a SAM radar signal – this meant an air-to-ground picture that looked like 10,001 SAM signals, only one of which was real…” [5] No doubt the USAF and US Navy have spent considerable resources figuring out how to disable or circumvent such measures, and it may well be that this particular case is nothing to sweat over. But this is just the tip of the iceberg of a much more deeply thought-out and far-reaching Chinese concept that the West has (correctly or incorrectly) labeled the "Assassin's Mace". Fundamentally, Assassin's Mace refers to the set of tools that one would use to very quickly and very suddenly gain the initiative in a conflict with an opponent who is better-armed in terms of conventional weapons. Into this bucket of tools, we might imagine components like: Anti-satellite missiles to destroy the communications and navigation satellites upon which China's enemies would rely Sophisticated jamming efforts of the kind described in the article, intended to fool an opponent's smart weapons into going after dummy targets Communications hacking that could compromise troop movements, deployment schedules, etc. Viruses to attack critical infrastucture like power plants Theft of technical details on advanced weapons that would enable either the development of counter-measures or production of Chinese copies The latter of these is already known to have happened, China has tested anti-satellite missiles as well, and American intelligence figures openly express concern at the scope, sophistication and apparent success of the Chinese military's hacking campaigns against both the US government and private companies. The point in mentioning this is that, in the one area where the US does not have a clear edge both in terms of technology and experience, China poses very significant threat, whose potency is not an illusion at all.ConclusionIn order for me to agree with the statement that the PLA is a paper tiger, most of the following would have to be true: China's foreign policy claims are not matched by the power of its military to enforce those foreign policy claims China's military itself cannot be sustained at current levels in the future, given the strength of its economy and population China's military technology is intended to fight rivals' militaries on a one-for-one basis despite minimal battlefield experience on its part There exist no areas in which Chinese inexperience in combat could be compensated for (cyber-warfare, i.e.) Yet as I've tried to lay out here, all of the above are almost certainly false, or at best doubtful. I said in another answer[4] that China's armed forces are not, and have never been, intended to go blow-for-blow with the United States in the open ocean or in neutral skies; rather, the PLA's primary goal is to fight and win a contained conflict in the Western Pacific. While the PLA Navy's recent commissioning of its first aircraft carrier may carry symbolic propaganda value domestically, it is almost certainly not signaling of any desire to re-fight the battle of Midwaya la Chinoise--the critical elements of China's arsenal aren't aircraft carriers (if indeed they ever will be), but missiles, submarines and probably cyber-warfare. It would be extremely dangerous for any would-be opponent of China to gleefully ignore China's very real, lethal military capabilities, and dismiss Chinese foreign policy as no more than amateurish brinkmanship by people who don't know just how weak they are. On the contrary: China's entire military development in the last 30 years has been predicated on a very level-headed analysis of both its own weaknesses and those of its rivals.NOTES:[1]One thing worth note is the inclusion of nominal GDP, which is simply calculated by converting a country's gross domestic product from local currency into USD. Although perhaps less useful for measuring a country's well-being than PPP, I had a professor once explain why, in defense strategy, nominal GDP matters more: Anyone wishing to buy an AK-47 or a FN FAL can pay in diamonds, rupees, dirhams, camels or cocaine; but anyone wishing to buy a Patriot missile battery or a squadron of Eurofighter Typhoon jets is buying a good made in an advanced country (the US, Europe, Russia, etc) which either is priced in USD, or benchmarked to competitor products that are, by European or Russian manufacturers. The claim, which I find worthy, was that for anyone to fight a war with any hope of winning it these days, they must be able to pay for advanced weapons not in local currency, but in the currency of the advanced world--the US dollar. 'Murica.[2]I don't take one in this answer, nor do I really have one in private. To be perfectly frank, my philosophy when it comes to international affairs is "might makes right"; when it comes to war, my idea of a worthwhile fight is a fair fight, and my idea of a fair fight is clubbing a baby seal over the head.... Clearly, international politics wouldn't appeal to me as much if I wasn't American.[3] Wendell Minnick, "China Pursues Systems To Keep US Forces at Bay",Defense News, 17 Sep 2013. [China Pursues Systems To Keep US Forces at Bay][4]See:Kyle Murao's answer to Who would win in this war: the USA, the U.K, Japan, and South Korea vs Russia, China, and North Korea?.[5] David Hambling, "China Looks to Undermine U.S. Power, With 'Assassin's Mace'",Wired, 2 Jul 2009.Read other related questions onQuora: What is it like to be in the People's Liberation Army (PLA)? Is Vladimir Putin a paper tiger? How many people have served in the People's Liberation Army? Read more answers on Quora. 源地址 http://www.quora.com/China-in-2014/Is-the-Chinese-Peoples-Liberation-Army-a-Paper-Tiger/answer/Kyle-Murao